This Twitter thread criticizes a court ruling that bans carrying guns on public transport, despite no evidence of crimes. The judge ignored historical facts, flawed analogies, and differences like permit systems. The author hopes the Supreme Court will correct these mistakes and protect gun rights.
Certainly a major disappointment, and one which reverses a well-reasoned district court ruling striking down the ban. The State could not point to any evidence of people with CCW permits committing crimes on public transportation, so the ban also has no real public policy argument for existing, in addition to being unconstitutional.
This ruling is also disappointing because Judge St. Eve was on the panel and did not dissent, which is perhaps a poor sign for how she may rule in the upcoming AWB cases being heard later this month.
A thread on today's ruling and its analytical errors.
@2AFDN
In a disappointing opinion, the Seventh Circuit has reversed SAF's district court win overturning Illinois' public transit carry ban, and upheld the ban as constitutional. https://t.co/Sl0SdtOpJB
From the start, the panel appears to be misleading. In the 19th century, trains absolutely existed, and no state that we know of banned carry on them. A few of the train companies had rules requiring guns be stored locked up, but most did not. And regardless, private company rules are not a “historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
While the Founders didn't have trains, the generations not long after them did. If courts are going to insist on using 19th century analogues, then the lack of restrictions in that time period should also be considered.
A bit of a sidenote, but it’s interesting that one of the plaintiffs got mooted out by becoming a police officer. The panel does not dwell at all on why an off-duty police officer should have special carry privileges over and above regular citizens with CCW permits. It should have at least acknowledged this double standard.
One small positive tidbit in this ruling is that the panel turned away the government’s argument that plaintiff’s lacked standing because even if they defeated the law they challenge, other rules still bar them from carrying on public transport.
The standing analysis is lengthy, but we won't get into it here, and will go straight to the Second Amendment discussion.
The panel cites one of SAF’s other cases, May v. Bonta (which was consolidated with Wolford on appeal), and implies that the Illinois ban survives because it does allow an exception for unloaded and secured firearms, which California’s law did not.
But public transport has existed throughout our nation's history. What began as carriages in the founding era later became trains in the 19th century. What was lacking is any restrictions on carrying in these places.
The panel says that even though the "in terror of the people" laws were different in that they did not ban carry, they still stood for the "principle" of banning carry in crowded places.
Except they didn't. They banned a criminal act in a crowded place, at best. If this is how analogues are to proceed, then there is no limiting principle.
The Supreme Court has rejected this sort of analogue. "Even when a law regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, though, it may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding." United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024).
Like the Ninth Circuit in Wolford, the panel focuses in on rare local ordinances, in this case an 1817 New Orleans ordinance banning carry in public ballrooms.
But Bruen rejected two state laws as insufficient to justify carry bans, because they were outliers. Whenever courts rely on small local outliers, they never seem to acknowledge this point from Bruen.
Yet another in a long list of analytical errors (or perhaps outright defiance) the Supreme Court must act urgently to correct.
The panel focuses on its "crowded place" analogy, while ignoring a major difference between carry before 1900 and carry today in a state like Illinois: carry permits.
Illinois, like California and Hawaii, has no constitutional carry. So those who carry are vetted by the government given they must get CCW permits.
Any analogizing to historical laws must not only focus on very generalized similarities, but also critical differences because it is relevant to the "how" analysis.
It is very frustrating when courts pretend they do not understand reality, or are so used to having professional security they have lost touch with what regular people deal with.
Someone getting off a train, pulling out a gun, and reassembling it may have been fine at a train stop in 1875. It would not work today in Illinois, where the site of a gun may cause panic.
Open carry is generally not allowed in Illinois in most circumstances. It's not clear what the panel has in mind here.
The panel seems to endorse the idea that government can ban carry on all its property. While saying Bruen does not "necessarily" endorse this, it's not clear where the limit would be.
To be fair, in the very next section, the panel says it is explicitly NOT doing that, rejecting that the government can ban carry everywhere that it is the proprietor.
But given what it just said previously, it's not clear why not.
The panel stubbornly refuses to acknowledge that hundreds of railroad existed in the 19th century. It is bizarre.
As if hearing our complaint, the panel finally goes into a discussion of 19th century train company restrictions.
However, even if private company rules were proper analogues, the panel ignores that most companies did not have such rules. California's expert could only identify a few, and most were not even total carry bans. The majority of railroads did not restrict carry.
As we pointed out in Wolford, a mere six examples is meaningless at a time when hundreds of different railroad companies existed at various times.
The panel acknowledges that Bruen said three analogues are not enough. But in its ruling, it relied on very sparse local restrictions to uphold the ban and justify its "crowded places" principle.
All in all, this ruling repeatedly says it is listening to Bruen, while flouting it at every turn.
We hope the Supreme Court steps in soon to address rulings like this. It can begin to address "Sensitive places" by granting cert in Wolford, as the federal government has also urged it to do.
Certainly a major disappointment, and one which reverses a well-reasoned district court ruling striking down the ban. The State could not point to any evidence of people with CCW permits committing crimes on public transportation, so the ban also has no real public policy argument for existing, in addition to being unconstitutional.
This ruling is also disappointing because Judge St. Eve was on the panel and did not dissent, which is perhaps a poor sign for how she may rule in the upcoming AWB cases being heard later this month.
A thread on today's ruling and its analytical errors.From the start, the panel appears to be misleading. In the 19th century, trains absolutely existed, and no state that we know of banned carry on them. A few of the train companies had rules requiring guns be stored locked up, but most did not. And regardless, private company rules are not a “historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
While the Founders didn't have trains, the generations not long after them did. If courts are going to insist on using 19th century analogues, then the lack of restrictions in that time period should also be considered.A bit of a sidenote, but it’s interesting that one of the plaintiffs got mooted out by becoming a police officer. The panel does not dwell at all on why an off-duty police officer should have special carry privileges over and above regular citizens with CCW permits. It should have at least acknowledged this double standard.One small positive tidbit in this ruling is that the panel turned away the government’s argument that plaintiff’s lacked standing because even if they defeated the law they challenge, other rules still bar them from carrying on public transport.
The standing analysis is lengthy, but we won't get into it here, and will go straight to the Second Amendment discussion.The panel cites one of SAF’s other cases, May v. Bonta (which was consolidated with Wolford on appeal), and implies that the Illinois ban survives because it does allow an exception for unloaded and secured firearms, which California’s law did not.But public transport has existed throughout our nation's history. What began as carriages in the founding era later became trains in the 19th century. What was lacking is any restrictions on carrying in these places.The panel says that even though the "in terror of the people" laws were different in that they did not ban carry, they still stood for the "principle" of banning carry in crowded places.
Except they didn't. They banned a criminal act in a crowded place, at best. If this is how analogues are to proceed, then there is no limiting principle.
The Supreme Court has rejected this sort of analogue. "Even when a law regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, though, it may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding." United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024).Like the Ninth Circuit in Wolford, the panel focuses in on rare local ordinances, in this case an 1817 New Orleans ordinance banning carry in public ballrooms.
But Bruen rejected two state laws as insufficient to justify carry bans, because they were outliers. Whenever courts rely on small local outliers, they never seem to acknowledge this point from Bruen.
Yet another in a long list of analytical errors (or perhaps outright defiance) the Supreme Court must act urgently to correct.The panel focuses on its "crowded place" analogy, while ignoring a major difference between carry before 1900 and carry today in a state like Illinois: carry permits.
Illinois, like California and Hawaii, has no constitutional carry. So those who carry are vetted by the government given they must get CCW permits.
Any analogizing to historical laws must not only focus on very generalized similarities, but also critical differences because it is relevant to the "how" analysis.It is very frustrating when courts pretend they do not understand reality, or are so used to having professional security they have lost touch with what regular people deal with.
Someone getting off a train, pulling out a gun, and reassembling it may have been fine at a train stop in 1875. It would not work today in Illinois, where the site of a gun may cause panic.
Open carry is generally not allowed in Illinois in most circumstances. It's not clear what the panel has in mind here.The panel seems to endorse the idea that government can ban carry on all its property. While saying Bruen does not "necessarily" endorse this, it's not clear where the limit would be.To be fair, in the very next section, the panel says it is explicitly NOT doing that, rejecting that the government can ban carry everywhere that it is the proprietor.
But given what it just said previously, it's not clear why not.The panel stubbornly refuses to acknowledge that hundreds of railroad existed in the 19th century. It is bizarre.As if hearing our complaint, the panel finally goes into a discussion of 19th century train company restrictions.
However, even if private company rules were proper analogues, the panel ignores that most companies did not have such rules. California's expert could only identify a few, and most were not even total carry bans. The majority of railroads did not restrict carry.As we pointed out in Wolford, a mere six examples is meaningless at a time when hundreds of different railroad companies existed at various times.The panel acknowledges that Bruen said three analogues are not enough. But in its ruling, it relied on very sparse local restrictions to uphold the ban and justify its "crowded places" principle.All in all, this ruling repeatedly says it is listening to Bruen, while flouting it at every turn.
We hope the Supreme Court steps in soon to address rulings like this. It can begin to address "Sensitive places" by granting cert in Wolford, as the federal government has also urged it to do.
yes
Certainly a major disappointment, and one which reverses a well-reasoned district court ruling striking down the ban. The State could not point to any evidence of people with CCW permits committing crimes on public transportation, so the ban also has no real public policy argument for existing, in addition to being unconstitutional.
This ruling is also disappointing because Judge St. Eve was on the panel and did not dissent, which is perhaps a poor sign for how she may rule in the upcoming AWB cases being heard later this month.
A thread on today's ruling and its analytical errors. ... From the start, the panel appears to be misleading. In the 19th century, trains absolutely existed, and no state that we know of banned carry on them. A few of the train companies had rules requiring guns be stored locked up, but most did not. And regardless, private company rules are not a “historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
While the Founders didn't have trains, the generations not long after them did. If courts are going to insist on using 19th century analogues, then the lack of restrictions in that time period should also be considered. ... A bit of a sidenote, but it’s interesting that one of the plaintiffs got mooted out by becoming a police officer. The panel does not dwell at all on why an off-duty police officer should have special carry privileges over and above regular citizens with CCW permits. It should have at least acknowledged this double standard. ... One small positive tidbit in this ruling is that the panel turned away the government’s argument that plaintiff’s lacked standing because even if they defeated the law they challenge, other rules still bar them from carrying on public transport.
The standing analysis is lengthy, but we won't get into it here, and will go straight to the Second Amendment discussion. ... The panel cites one of SAF’s other cases, May v. Bonta (which was consolidated with Wolford on appeal), and implies that the Illinois ban survives because it does allow an exception for unloaded and secured firearms, which California’s law did not. ... But public transport has existed throughout our nation's history. What began as carriages in the founding era later became trains in the 19th century. What was lacking is any restrictions on carrying in these places. ... The panel says that even though the "in terror of the people" laws were different in that they did not ban carry, they still stood for the "principle" of banning carry in crowded places.
Except they didn't. They banned a criminal act in a crowded place, at best. If this is how analogues are to proceed, then there is no limiting principle.
The Supreme Court has rejected this sort of analogue. "Even when a law regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, though, it may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding." United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024). ... Like the Ninth Circuit in Wolford, the panel focuses in on rare local ordinances, in this case an 1817 New Orleans ordinance banning carry in public ballrooms.
But Bruen rejected two state laws as insufficient to justify carry bans, because they were outliers. Whenever courts rely on small local outliers, they never seem to acknowledge this point from Bruen.
Yet another in a long list of analytical errors (or perhaps outright defiance) the Supreme Court must act urgently to correct. ... The panel focuses on its "crowded place" analogy, while ignoring a major difference between carry before 1900 and carry today in a state like Illinois: carry permits.
Illinois, like California and Hawaii, has no constitutional carry. So those who carry are vetted by the government given they must get CCW permits.
Any analogizing to historical laws must not only focus on very generalized similarities, but also critical differences because it is relevant to the "how" analysis. ... It is very frustrating when courts pretend they do not understand reality, or are so used to having professional security they have lost touch with what regular people deal with.
Someone getting off a train, pulling out a gun, and reassembling it may have been fine at a train stop in 1875. It would not work today in Illinois, where the site of a gun may cause panic.
Open carry is generally not allowed in Illinois in most circumstances. It's not clear what the panel has in mind here. ... The panel seems to endorse the idea that government can ban carry on all its property. While saying Bruen does not "necessarily" endorse this, it's not clear where the limit would be. ... To be fair, in the very next section, the panel says it is explicitly NOT doing that, rejecting that the government can ban carry everywhere that it is the proprietor.
But given what it just said previously, it's not clear why not. ... The panel stubbornly refuses to acknowledge that hundreds of railroad existed in the 19th century. It is bizarre. ... As if hearing our complaint, the panel finally goes into a discussion of 19th century train company restrictions.
However, even if private company rules were proper analogues, the panel ignores that most companies did not have such rules. California's expert could only identify a few, and most were not even total carry bans. The majority of railroads did not restrict carry. ... As we pointed out in Wolford, a mere six examples is meaningless at a time when hundreds of different railroad companies existed at various times. ... The panel acknowledges that Bruen said three analogues are not enough. But in its ruling, it relied on very sparse local restrictions to uphold the ban and justify its "crowded places" principle. ... All in all, this ruling repeatedly says it is listening to Bruen, while flouting it at every turn.
We hope the Supreme Court steps in soon to address rulings like this. It can begin to address "Sensitive places" by granting cert in Wolford, as the federal government has also urged it to do.
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