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1/ Gloomy assessments by Russian milbloggers suggest that Russia faces serious difficulties in defeating Ukraine's Kursk offensive due to a lack of strategic reserves, a reliance on "patchwork" of badly attrited units, and the weakening of other fronts. ⬇️

2/ The "Philologist in Ambush" Telegram channel comments that although Russian reserves are being brought up to serve as a "fire brigade", they "continue to be insufficient even for sustainable stabilisation of the situation, let alone the defeat of the enemy grouping.

3/ "They are insufficient not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. On the enemy side, there are fairly well-equipped units and formations. So far we have a patchwork of fire brigades, and not enough in terms of numbers.

4/ "I won't take it upon myself to judge some units and formations of the strategic reserve, but, as the events of the last few days have shown, we don't have many operational reserves at all – to stop the crisis, reserves are being transferred from other parts of the front, …

5/ …and not only from the nearest Kharkiv direction, but also from other directions (including those in which our troops have had at least some limited successes in the last few months), thus further weakening our already thinning ranks in these directions.

6/ "Reserves arriving from other areas are, by definition, mostly undermanned due to existing losses.

7/ "These losses are often quite high due to the poor organisation of combat work with poorly supported attacks within the framework of a strategy that requires an offensive in all possible areas.

8/ "Plus, not all formations and units can be pulled out from other directions entirely, because they are directly involved in offensive actions.

9/ "As a result, against initially fully equipped formations and units of the enemy group, we have to a large extent a scattering of grouplets of the type of the sagging BTGs of the summer of 2022.

10/ "Add to this the enemy's advantage in military-technical means (including communication systems and UAVs), organisational structures (primarily in individual units and subdivisions of strike UAVs) and a flexible operational control system that allows them to…

11/ …adequately respond to changes in the situation and promptly inflict fire damage on identified targets, and we get a very specific assessment of the activities of our top military leadership, including, first of all, Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov." /end

Source:

1/ Gloomy assessments by Russian milbloggers suggest that Russia faces serious difficulties in defeating Ukraine's Kursk offensive due to a lack of strategic reserves, a reliance on "patchwork" of badly attrited units, and the weakening of other fronts. ⬇️ 2/ The "Philologist in Ambush" Telegram channel comments that although Russian reserves are being brought up to serve as a "fire brigade", they "continue to be insufficient even for sustainable stabilisation of the situation, let alone the defeat of the enemy grouping.3/ "They are insufficient not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. On the enemy side, there are fairly well-equipped units and formations. So far we have a patchwork of fire brigades, and not enough in terms of numbers.4/ "I won't take it upon myself to judge some units and formations of the strategic reserve, but, as the events of the last few days have shown, we don't have many operational reserves at all – to stop the crisis, reserves are being transferred from other parts of the front, …5/ …and not only from the nearest Kharkiv direction, but also from other directions (including those in which our troops have had at least some limited successes in the last few months), thus further weakening our already thinning ranks in these directions.6/ "Reserves arriving from other areas are, by definition, mostly undermanned due to existing losses.7/ "These losses are often quite high due to the poor organisation of combat work with poorly supported attacks within the framework of a strategy that requires an offensive in all possible areas.8/ "Plus, not all formations and units can be pulled out from other directions entirely, because they are directly involved in offensive actions.9/ "As a result, against initially fully equipped formations and units of the enemy group, we have to a large extent a scattering of grouplets of the type of the sagging BTGs of the summer of 2022.10/ "Add to this the enemy's advantage in military-technical means (including communication systems and UAVs), organisational structures (primarily in individual units and subdivisions of strike UAVs) and a flexible operational control system that allows them to…11/ …adequately respond to changes in the situation and promptly inflict fire damage on identified targets, and we get a very specific assessment of the activities of our top military leadership, including, first of all, Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov." /endSource:

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