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THREAD 1/15 Maia #Sandu essentially repeated David Cameron's gamble and has nearly staged #Moldova's Brexit (Moldexit) even before joining the EU.

2/15 Sandu assumed that the pro-European sentiment among voters was stronger than the support for her government. Since she leads the pro-European camp, she expected that backing the European choice would strengthen her mandate and lift her political standing.

3/15 Cameron had a similar strategy—he sought to tap into euroscepticism, thinking it would boost his mandate without going beyond his control.

4/15 In Moldova, pro-European sentiment did surpass Sandu’s electoral result, but not to the extent she hoped. And certainly not enough to convincingly bolster the outcome she achieved in elections.

5/15 Much like with Cameron, the outcome turned out quite the opposite.

6/15 The problem with rare direct democracy (unlike Switzerland or ancient city-states where it's common) is that voters often use referendums to express opinions not just on the issue at hand, but also on the government calling the vote.

7/15 Despite the protest vote, we witnessed an important turning point in Eastern Europe. When Central and Eastern Europe transitioned to democracy in the '90s, political elites assumed they could compete for power but on the solid foundation of a majority European choice.

8/15 This was true in Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltics, and Croatia. Changing ruling parties didn’t mean shifting the country’s overall direction, so transitions were less dramatic, though still intense.

9/15 In Russia, this wasn't the case. Or at least, it was believed not to be. Hence the problem with Yeltsin's reelection in 1996.

10/15 Clearly, this is still not the case in Turkey, Serbia, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Belarus, and even Ukraine before 2014’s and 2022's war and annexations.

11/15 In none of these countries is the European choice a platform for political competition. Instead, it is the subject of the competition itself, even where, as in Georgia, it is enshrined in the constitution.

12/15 In Moldova, where European alignment seemed a given, this reality is sharper.

13/15 The fact that European alignment is not a consensus but a struggle for much of Eastern Europe shows that the EU's political pull is weakening over time and distance.

14/15 This is a cause for serious European reflection. After all, it wasn’t special or uniquely tolerant people who made the European choice in the '90s—it was ordinary citizens, just like those who now doubt it in Moldova.

15/15 And yes, Russia’s war against Ukraine and its progress directly relate to these doubts.

THREAD 1/15 Maia #Sandu essentially repeated David Cameron's gamble and has nearly staged #Moldova's Brexit (Moldexit) even before joining the EU.2/15 Sandu assumed that the pro-European sentiment among voters was stronger than the support for her government. Since she leads the pro-European camp, she expected that backing the European choice would strengthen her mandate and lift her political standing.3/15 Cameron had a similar strategy—he sought to tap into euroscepticism, thinking it would boost his mandate without going beyond his control.4/15 In Moldova, pro-European sentiment did surpass Sandu’s electoral result, but not to the extent she hoped. And certainly not enough to convincingly bolster the outcome she achieved in elections.5/15 Much like with Cameron, the outcome turned out quite the opposite.6/15 The problem with rare direct democracy (unlike Switzerland or ancient city-states where it's common) is that voters often use referendums to express opinions not just on the issue at hand, but also on the government calling the vote.7/15 Despite the protest vote, we witnessed an important turning point in Eastern Europe. When Central and Eastern Europe transitioned to democracy in the '90s, political elites assumed they could compete for power but on the solid foundation of a majority European choice.8/15 This was true in Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltics, and Croatia. Changing ruling parties didn’t mean shifting the country’s overall direction, so transitions were less dramatic, though still intense.9/15 In Russia, this wasn't the case. Or at least, it was believed not to be. Hence the problem with Yeltsin's reelection in 1996.10/15 Clearly, this is still not the case in Turkey, Serbia, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Belarus, and even Ukraine before 2014’s and 2022's war and annexations.11/15 In none of these countries is the European choice a platform for political competition. Instead, it is the subject of the competition itself, even where, as in Georgia, it is enshrined in the constitution.12/15 In Moldova, where European alignment seemed a given, this reality is sharper.13/15 The fact that European alignment is not a consensus but a struggle for much of Eastern Europe shows that the EU's political pull is weakening over time and distance.14/15 This is a cause for serious European reflection. After all, it wasn’t special or uniquely tolerant people who made the European choice in the '90s—it was ordinary citizens, just like those who now doubt it in Moldova.15/15 And yes, Russia’s war against Ukraine and its progress directly relate to these doubts.

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