🧵A thread discussing the theoretical foundation of Soviet small-unit tactics:
The Soviet platoon is organized around the senior lieutenant, who commands the unit, and is relegated to an integrated control element, where he is assisted by a deputy platoon commander who serves to relieve certain duties. Each platoon has a sniper/marksman, who provides
Platoons are instructed to dismount and prepare for an engagement roughly 2-3km before reaching the line of contact. This is due to the fact that the enemies anti-tank systems will struggle to reliably engage BMPs or BTRs at this distance. Following this, the platoon will break a
The platoon commander must coordinate fires, determine objectives which are to be engaged by his subordinates, and survey the terrain to ensure the destruction of the enemy as well as the survival of his men. As a result the platoon commander operates exceedingly close to the
In almost every manual on this subject, three key details are present with extreme consistency, those being firepower, "striking power", and maneuverability. These factors are taken into account prior to the conduct of an offensive operation, and throughout the course of
Calculating the ability for a platoon to deliver effective fire through small arms was done on the basis of rounds per minute per 1 meter of frontage per squad. This is achieved by dividing the expected rounds per minute by the length of the squads offensive front in meters. The
Striking power is the ability for a platoon to deliver fire while one the move, or as manuals would state "deliver powerful blows to the enemy". As a result the striking power is best defined as the ability for a unit to advance on the enemy and capture their immediate position
Maneuverability is defined by the mobility of the platoon within the terrain they are most likely to encounter as well as the capacity for the unit to reposition, overcome obstacles such as rivers, zones of chemical/radiological contamination, fires, etc etc.
In order to determine the expected offensive front of a platoon, the firepower expressed by the unit's small arms is used. For example, it is generally understood that a density of 9 rounds per meter per minute offers a platoon a 3 fold superiority over defending forces, the
A platoon may see the attachment of automatic grenade launchers, flamethrowers, as well additional machine guns. In the case of tanks being attached to a platoon, intervals of 100 meters between APCs or IFVs and MBTs will see use. The attachment of tanks to a motorized rifle
Despite the availability of attached river crossing systems and amphibious IFVs/APCs, river crossings were still considered a serious obstacle in the 1980s for any unit to reliably contend with (of course the significance of this obstacle depends largely on the width, depth,
In urban settings, the platoon commander has similar expectations, of course his terrain assessment must include unique obstacles, but the bulk of his work remains unchanged. Flamethrowers, and additional machine gunners will see attachment before the operation begins. Prior to
A motorized rifle platoon advances in a "chain" formation, IFVs operate in intervals of 100 meters, with grenade launchers occupying 50 meter gaps in between if attached. Individual combatants are often separated by 8-12 meters. The "chain" is preferred as the infantry can move
In a pursuit the platoon will seek to cut off the enemy and position themselves along the axis of their retreat. If this is impossible, the platoon cooperates with neighboring formations to deliver as much fire as possible in the direction of the fleeing enemy while moving to cut
A motorized rifle platoon may dedicate one of its squads to establishing a reconnaissance ambush, conducting chemical reconnaissance, or surveillance of the enemy through more active means. The platoon itself passively conducts reconnaissance through the capture of prisoners, the
A reconnaissance ambush is done to capture prisoners, weapons, and documents, to determine the composition of an enemies defense, targeting singular combatants, primarily officers, or unsupported patrols. A successful ambush is one which does not arouse immediate suspicion from
A squad operating as a reconnaissance patrol moves at a distance of 400-1500 meters from the platoon. They may also engage in raids within the rear of the enemy. If it is possible to conduct surveillance from an armored vehicle, the squad commander will leave his deputy in
When a motorized rifle squad dismounts from its transportation, be that an IFV or APC, the commander instructs the driver where to situate the vehicle as to best support his dismounts. The squads machine gunner will position himself in a location where he may conduct surveillance
The squads commander is to employ quite a lot of initiative when commanding his men, and the platoon commander is trained to expect this of his squads. He will inform his units when it is best to throw grenades, when they are to advance, and how to most effectively make use of
When assaulting a trench it is important that the squad avoids engaging in point blank engagements with the enemy, unless it is necessary that the trench see application as cover. In this case the squads machine gun will protect the flanks, accompanied by the grenadier (RPG),
As soon as the enemy has been destroyed or fled from the position the squad was instructed to occupy, the platoon commander is informed, and a pursuit begins. If the enemy has been routed, the squad may remount and pursue the enemy within their transportation. If tanks have been
Anyways the thread concludes here, thanks for reading, expect part 2 to be released sometime in the next two weeks, and make sure to follow @LeberkaasArt, she does fantastic work, such as the first image used in this thread.
@LeberkaasArt Make sure to check out my articles on chemical defense and night fighting as well for further information which is pertinent to this topic, they are linked in my bio.